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This article proposes that the social contract is a trust-agreement of power because 
political organization implies a commission of confidence from the citizens to the authorities, 
through which they administer in their name public goods of diffuse ownership that belong 
to everyone but cannot be administered by everyone simultaneously, like it occurs in a 
private trust (where someone manages a patrimony for the benefit of another). From that 
relationship between governors and citizens arises a paradigm of duties and expectations –
relative to that delegated confidence– that frame the fiduciary democracy. This is some sort 
of “improved representative democracy”, as it inscribes itself in the frame of the tradition of 
representative democracy of liberal and republican origin, but proposes certain mechanisms 
of direct democratic involvement –especially for the purpose of vertical accountability– that 
can make political representation more functional and coherent. 
 
Introduction 
The political history of mankind is also the story of what citizens have been forced 
or forbidden to do along the centuries.  Power, the prime matter of politics, is the 
capability of coercing others to do what one decides. 
Similarly, along the progress of history, several narratives, not necessarily political, 
have dealt with the problems that for the flesh and blood human being –the individual– 
coexistence with power entails.  These encompass founding myths as ancient as The Book 
of Job (wherein God uses his omnipotence so frivolously that he even bets with the devil 
on the fate of his most faithful creature) up to popular cultural demonstrations such as the 
film series Star Wars, in whose third episode Anakin Skywalker becomes Darth Vader, 
thus explaining that the “dark side of the Force” consists in letting oneself be carried away 
by the willful desire of accumulating power. 
These narratives have in common the description of narcissisms (as well as 
extreme narcissists) which in their unbridled hunger for imposing their will finally 
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manage, precisely, to concentrate power disproportionately to oppress their equals. The 
history of democracy, within political history, is the history of how those concentrating-
power narcissisms are limited by the rest of citizens, who constitute the potential victims 
or past victims of the concentration of power.  The history of democracy –of liberal 
democracy at least– is the history of the consecration of freedom and of individual dignity. 
 
But while a tyrant is who par excellence employs concentrated power to impose his most 
eccentric and extravagant crazes (and history provides countless examples, from Caligula 
and Nero to Stalin and Hitler), there exist other forms, even within apparently democratic 
structures, of denaturing the logic of collective action understood as a guarantee of 
individual freedom, as it will be seen towards the end of this paper. 
In a democracy, of course, those mechanisms acquire much better intentioned 
appearances than outright totalitarian narcissism.  Left and right clamor for certain values 
that have to be imposed by the force of law. But the concrete measures that these 
interventions foster –quotas, taxes, censorships, or whatever other imperative or 
inalienability rules (in Guido Calabresi‘s nomenclature1)–, restrict freedom or burden 
other people´s patrimony posing a moral (philosophical) dilemma and a practical 
(economic) challenge, since these interventions penalize not only legitimate but also 
desirable activities, such as the unfolding of productive activities and wealth generation.    
Good intentions are usually the adequate alibi for introducing this type of 
measures, whatever political tag is used to do so (conservative, socialist, or even liberal2). 
In this way, in societies with a strong Puritan identity such as the United States, individual 
rights were violated even once the culture of human rights had long been established.  For 
example, it was only in 2003 that anti-sodomy3 laws, which had been ratified as recently 
as 19864, were declared unconstitutional.  In another sense, today we are witnessing  how 
egalitarian voluntarism –understood as referred to the material field and not only limited 
to equal protection by the law– has wrought havoc in Europe due to the wasteful voracity 
of welfare States that have endangered their own viability as well as discredited the 
democracies that host them.  
While in the first case democracy proved mean in recognizing negative freedoms 
such as the right to one´s sexual identity, in the second, democracy becomes a boaster of 
its promises of an unsustainable welfare.  Both undermine and discredit the democratic 
                                                          
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089, 1111-14 (1972). 
2 Perhaps because of this Alaisdair MacIntyre accuses liberalism (or liberalisms) of being “emotivists”. See e.g., ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 23 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 2d ed. 1984) 
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 41 S. W. 3d 349 
4 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 USA 186 (1986) 
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system and the ideals that support it, as I will argue later.  And they do so because they 
betray the confidence that citizens deposit in their government. I therefore suggest that 
the social contract is a trust by which power is delegated, and the best way to understand 
it and put it into practice is through some specific mechanisms of direct participation.  
This paradigm can be labeled “fiduciary democracy”.     
 
This concept does not pretend to refound political democracy.  Nor does it 
constitute a kind of hybrid or balance between the models of representative democracy, 
on the one hand, and direct or participative democracy, on the other.  This proposal 
inscribes itself, clearly, within the representative democracy of liberal and republican 
origins. It does admit, however, certain mechanisms of direct participative democracy that 
make political representation more functional and coherent and allow for a better 
concretion of the trust foundations of political organization.  In that sense, the fiduciary 
democracy I propose is an “improved” representative democracy.   
The proposal of this paper is based on verifying –descriptively– the relevance of 
the trust-agreement elements in the historical construction of the existent democracy. 
However, due to the fact that those elements are present in an intuitive manner and not 
sufficiently explicit, a deeper level of meditation is required about the consequences that 
those elements entail. I will, therefore, embark on an effort to establish the bases for this 
meditation and employ them to develop with a more normative perspective the first 
outlines of the institutional reinforcements that a democracy which is conscious of its 
fiduciary essence could adopt to perfect itself. 
In the first section of this paper I focus on the importance of confidence within the 
social fabric.  The second section tries to delve more deeply into the anthropological 
foundations of confidence as the basis of collaboration, which derives in a fiduciary 
structure that articulates political life as a collaborative scope for the thorough realization 
of individuals.  The third section explains the nature of public goods which constitute 
themselves in the raw materials of the political mandate. Starting from the aforesaid, the 
fourth section explains with greater precision why the social contract is a trust and what 
implications follow, so as to establish reasonable limits to political intervention and, 
therefore, to coercion.  The fifth section lands the aforesaid in the structure of a functional-
fiduciary democracy; that is, it specifies the principal elements and consequences of the 
social contract being a democratic trust. Finally, the sixth section analyzes the recurrent 
cases in which the social contract fails in the way in which it is usually applied, whether by 
excess or defect of the fiduciary components that support it.    
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1. A Political Economy of Social Confidence and Collaboration 
It is not too controversial to affirm that a high degree of interpersonal confidence 
between citizens should result in social cohesion that benefits governability, including a 
non- democratic one. Thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville5 and more recently Francis 
Fukuyama6 have insisted on this assertion.  An important correlation also exists between a 
higher degree of interpersonal confidence and the functionality of democracy7.     
Thus, in the following graph it is possible to observe the tendency that countries 
where their citizens show more confidence towards their authorities also present a higher 




Once the relationship between confidence and democracy is confirmed9, it is 
worthwhile to reflect on the implications this entails. On one hand, we are satisfied with 
democracy, which is a system of accumulation of political preferences whose principal 
attribute, at least in the liberal tradition of the modern world, is to limit the power of the 
government.10 In other words, when people can trust their authorities there is also a 
                                                          
5 5032 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, LA DEMOCRACIA EN AMÉRICA 165, 172-214 (Fondo de Cultura Económica 1978).  
6 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY, 10-11 (Free Press 1995). 
7 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & ROBERTO LEONARDI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1993).  See also MARK E. WARREN, Ed., DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 3-5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).  
8 COOPERACIÓN LATINOBARÓMETRO, LATINOBARÓMETRO INFORME 2010 (2010) 
9 However, it does not seem possible to argue that interpersonal confidence generates by itself democracy, in other words, that it 
weakens authoritarianism or that it makes democracy viable when it is non-existent, as the Chinese case would demonstrate. 
Democracy would rather seem to stabilize existent democracies. 
See TANG WENFANG, INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA. (2004). 
10 NORBERTO BOBBIO. DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF STATE POWER. (Univ. of Minn. Press 
1989). 
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higher degree of satisfaction with the mechanisms by which power is both delegated and 
limited. 
We then have that for political delegation to work, what and how much power is 
delegated is not an anecdotic result; but substantial. That comes as no surprise, since 
somehow modern political thought has been facing this confirmation, ever since Hobbes 
and Locke developed their divergent positions about the intensity of power that should be 
legitimately entrusted to the State11.   
The challenge of democracy then consists in finding the mechanisms that ensure 
the level of collaboration aimed to preserve the individual freedoms without falling into 
excesses. The functionality of the political system will depend upon those mechanisms 
because they will serve as the base for their reliability, their credibility. 
In my opinion, neither the existing purely libertarian approaches –that emphasize 
the contractual component derived from the decontextualized freewill– nor the 
“progressive” or socializing (liberal in the American sense) approaches –based on a 
universal sense or intuition of duty– convincingly explain why human beings organize 
themselves politically the way they do, delegating what they do delegate, and sacrificing 
what they do sacrifice in that choice to obtain the benefits they obtain.   I suggest that the 
logic behind the political mandate –particularly when it is democratic– does not merely 
obey to circumstantial, pragmatic (convenient) nor cultural causes, but rather to causes 
profoundly rooted in human psychology. 
The idea of confidence as a basis for political organization acquires in this proposal 
a dimension different to the mere justifications of state interventions to argue in favor of 
social cohesion12.  On the contrary, this paper proposes that the State should focus on its 
fiduciary duties, which derive from the expectations of reasonable delegation in relation to 
its objective elements (public goods) and subjective elements (relationship between 
authorities and citizens).    
Instead of answering to abstract notions such as “the common good” –which 
ultimately mean little or nothing– these relationships concretize objective loyalties, based 
on specific ends, positions and interests. This generates a logic that can be described in a 
compatible way with modern game theories.  In them, one analyzes the way in which the 
interests of diverse “agents” differ or coincide, as a prolegomenon for the design of 
incentives which may align or reconcile those interests.  Regarding political mandates, as 
                                                          
11 See e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86 (Bobbs-Merrill 1958);   2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 124-146 
(New Am. Libr. 1965). 
12 In fact, not even a correlation can be stated –less so a causality– between greater state interventionism or wealth redistributing 
activism and the population´s index of confidence. According to Edelsman Trust Index for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 the 
countries with higher index of confidence include both highly interventionist countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India and 
countries that favor economic freedom such as Hong Kong or Singapore. 
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in any other cases in which an agent acts on behalf of a principal, it is evident that the 
misalignment of interests is not only a latent danger, but also a frequent one. Corruption 
cases are their bear witness. A typical agency problem occurs when the agent 
(government) who has to act to benefit its principal (citizens) does not necessarily have 
the incentives to do so.        
In order to analyze how the fiduciary relations of the government work, it becomes 
imperative not only to appeal to the Public Choice Theory –which explains how  politicians 
are economic agents who maximize benefits and not merely good souls, chiefly dedicated 
to the service of others and to the pursuit of the common good13– but also to the theories 
that analyze the logic of the relationship agent-principal, the use of which is more 
extended in the analysis of private organizations, particularly limited liability companies. 
This happens because in public limited companies, especially when they are widely held 
public companies, a misalignment of the interests of the owners-shareholders (principal) 
and those of the managers of the firm (agent) occurs.14 
In fact, the bigger the delegation, that is to say, the more disengaged the principal 
becomes of the matters he has entrusted to his agent, the bigger the probability that a 
misalignment of interests happens and, therefore, a deviation from the mandate that may 
take the form –in the political trust-agreement– of corruption or abuse of power (as 
authoritarianism, intrusion or abuse of powers). 
This malfunction of democracy happens to be apparently so common that 
Guillermo O´Donnell suggested it even constitutes a species within the genre of 
democratic regimes.  This author called  “delegative democracies” those  in which whoever 
wins an election can govern practically how he pleases, during the whole period of his 
mandate, with no limitation other than  that derived from the truly existent relationships  
of power (namely, factic powers) but without major institutional restrictions, and 
particularly, without horizontal accountability mechanisms –that is to say, without 
effective checks and balances from the other established powers in a scheme of effective 
separation of powers–15.   These dysfunctional democracies contradict each other, but at 
the same time are a bad imitation of representative democracies where accountability 
effectively occurs, especially horizontally, says O´Donnell, but this paper will also 
emphasize on the importance of vertical accountability.  In this way, the political trust 
democracy would also incorporate some specific direct participation mechanisms of the 
                                                          
13 100 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,  THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 244-47 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1965) 
14 Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3-27 (2000). 
15 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY at 55, 55-69 (1994). 
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principals (citizens) that not only generate better accountability but are also more 
responsive to the fiduciary nature of the delegation of confidence.   
In other words, what we find is that the problems of delegative democracies derive, in 
fact, from the constitutive or structural elements of the act of delegation of confidence, 
posing perverse incentives for those who receive the political mandates to betray the 
confidence of their principals. However, those structural elements are not invincible since 
legitimate and functional democracies do exist. What happens is that they have managed 
to canalize more effectively the requirements of the delegation of political confidence. 
This, as I suggest later, owes itself to a better comprehension and channeling of the 
subjective and objective elements of the political mandate. The first are related to the 
anthropological bases that determine the behavior of the subjects involved –principal and 
agent–. The latter, refers to the nature of public goods which are assigned in a trust. Let us 
analyze, then, the subjective element so as to explain later the nature of public goods 
assigned in a trust. 
 
2.  The “collaborative gene”:  fiduciary anthropology   
The subjective element of the fiduciary structure of public life and coexistence is our 
proneness to delegate and accept the delegation of public goods through political systems. 
Human beings, thus, have an intrinsic tendency to rely on others to achieve certain 
objectives (and act egotistically for others). Usually, this describes contractual relations, 
where the considerations are reciprocal. But in certain circumstances, collaboration 
happens to be so evidently complex, that it would not seem to be so easily ascribable to a 
mere exchange of goods and services.  This suggests the existence of a “meta-contractual” 
scope that explains the alluded proneness. 
In this section I will try to inquire why human beings have a tendency to collaborate 
socially and delegate politically, although they are also individualists in the search of the 
satisfaction of their own needs and preferences. I begin from the libertarian premise that 
nobody has the right to transfer the cost of their happiness to others, nor the duty to 
assume the cost of others´ happiness as a moral principle, but I confirm that in reality we 
seem to be programmed to do both things, at least regarding some very close fellow 
humans like our relatives. This dilemma was investigated at the time by Adam Smith who 
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments appeals to empathy –or sympathy– to try to articulate 
the bases of a vision of the human being as an individualist and altruist simultaneously, 
which when applied to society results in the fact that economic freedom ends up 
producing generalized welfare, amongst other reasons, because suppliers position 
themselves in the place of their consumers when they design the products and services 
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they offer16. However, scientific advances like evolutionary anthropology and 
neuroscience nowadays allow scrutinizing the mechanisms that explain collaborative 
individualism with a greater level of precision, though not with absolute certainty and 
objectivity. I will therefore employ references to certain scientific evidence to suggest 
certain probable coincidences; however these have not been proven. 
 
Simplifying, it could be suggested that human beings carry a kind of “collaborative 
gene” that explains why the recurrent use of collaborative formulas, even more complex 
and encompassing than contractual ones, is proper of our species.  If the human species is 
the only rational one and, thus, the only free one, it is at the same time one of the most 
collaborative ones. In fact, according to Harvard biologist and mathematician Martin 
Novak, the human being is the most collaborative species on the planet17. But there are 
species like ants or bees, as collaborative but unintelligent (and not free at all).  However, 
human collaboration, absolutely dependent on the confidence factor, probably finds its 
cause in a series of rational as well as emotional factors.   
In fact, the intellectual and emotional complexity of homo sapiens have a common 
cause, which we could refer to as “the biped curse”.  The western myth par excellence –The 
Book of Genesis– tells the story that when the first human beings were “expelled from 
Paradise” women were condemned to give “birth in pain”, and men to “win their bread 
with the sweat of their brows”.  Beyond the sexism of the assignation of the provider roll 
as something eminently masculine, the cause of both things: giving birth in pain and 
physical-manual labor is clearly the same: walking erectly.  To do so, it was necessary to 
narrow the hips, which in turn determined that giving birth became so painful. But that, in 
turn, freed the front extremities from the walking function and allowed the development 
of the capability of manipulating objects with the hands (opposable fingers), something 
directly related to the enormous growth of the brain (due to the development of manual 
capabilities that generate all types of protean functionalities)18.    
Getting food, via hunting and recollection initially, and then through agriculture, 
instead of having it at an arm’s length in the trees, is what the Bible seems to refer to with 
the curse derived from the expulsion from Paradise. But the protuberant brain (protected 
by a hard skull) which makes possible all these human activities makes it even more 
painful to give birth.  And both things –narrow hips and big brains– determine the 
comparatively premature birth of human beings, such as the first psychologists observed 
                                                          
16 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Metalibri 6th ed. 2006) (1790). 
17 Martin Novak, Why We Help, SCI. AM, Jul. 2012, at 22. 
18 Rolian Campbell, Daniel E. Llieberman & Benedikt Halgrimsson, The Coevolution of Human Hands and Feet 64 EVOLUTION 1558, 
1558-68 (2010). 
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in their time19.  Indeed, when born, ours is one of the less developed and less apt for 
independent life species20.  Also due to the aforesaid, we are one of the species where a 
most intense dependence upon ones parents can be observed, which –as is evident– 
triggers a very complex emotionality, as well as the intellectuality that accompanies it, 
derived from the superior brain of homo sapiens.  We have then, that the cause of our 
complex rationality is the same as the cause of our complex emotionality, and even 
modern neuroscience situates in the same region of the brain those systems which 
determine reasoning and decision-making and those which determine emotions and 
feelings21. 
This intensifies fiduciary duties of parents towards their children, since they cannot 
help themselves on their own, and require that their freedom be initially administered by 
their parents.  The cost of reason is the physical and emotional dependence (the 
parental/filial externality). This particular genesis of our species allows us to be more 
intelligent and skillful –more adaptive– but at the same time it makes us initially more 
dependent and for a longer time.  This allows us to reach farther, but depending first on 
others and assuming the duty of carrying the children.  Even though the aforesaid does not 
cancel the individualist nature of human beings, especially during adulthood, it does 
reveal clearly that they also unfold themselves in a consubstantial collaborative facet.   
The parent-child relationship which is one in which, by definition, one depends on the 
other, is in fact a fiduciary relationship (of confidence). A child´s survival depends on the 
fiduciary expectation, on the confidence that their parents will take care of them. And they 
begin to become conscious of themselves within that scheme, thus they acquire notion of 
their individuality in a situation of fiduciary expectation towards their parents; namely, 
awaiting from them certain acts of support. In that sense, the human brain has in some 
way been designed (hardware) or programmed (software) to expect certain things in 
exchange for others, with no apparent reciprocal symmetry. At least in the short run. 
Because, perhaps, the explanation that allows one to understand this sort of collaborative 
individualism is related to the fact that that reciprocity is differed in time. Namely, parents 
take care of their children under the implicit (and perhaps unconscious) expectation that, 
when elderly, their children will take care of them. This hardly works under a purely 
contractual –rational– logic because the consideration is too differed in time, and 
contractual relations work better in a specified period (that is the reason why every 
contract with an unspecified period can be dissolved without a cause by any party: 
contractualism repudiates perpetuity.) Therefore, what more or less guarantees the 
                                                          
19 SIGMUND FREUD & JAMES STRACHEY, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENT, 17-18 (WW Norton & Co. 2005) 
20 Id. 
21 ANTONIO DAMASIO, EL ERROR DE DESCARTES, 92-94 (Critica 2010). 
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fulfillment of the filial consideration is the elevated emotional component –gratuity and 
love– in the relationship between parents and children, that turns out to be a better 
marker of the fiduciary duty than conscious memory. 
 
 Well now, these duties and fiduciary expectations project themselves to other 
relationships different from the parent-child relations of the individual with others.  For 
example, a certain collaboration is required, which we can brand as fiduciary, to obtain 
something apparently as selfish as physical pleasure.  Indeed, the generation of 
endorphins benefits from relations with others, from sexual intercourse or eroticism, or 
simply from tenderness.             
On another level, the fiduciary logic extends also to political relations, to the political 
system, in which we can also verify fiduciary duties and expectations.  But it is worthwhile 
to discard, as of now, that the former implies an absolute universal solidarity, with all the 
ethical consequences that this could entail. The ideal of universal solidarity derives from 
the improvable Christian idea of universal love.  But as Ortega and Gasset wisely pointed 
out, love is the architect of hierarchies22; in other words, the differentiation between those 
who deserve it and those who do not deserve it is consubstantial to love.  If one cannot 
love his neighbor as himself, much less all other neighbors equally, it is neither possible to 
be universally solidary like collectivisms nor socialisms pretend. Neuroscience has been 
confirming it, as it has started to uncover the mechanisms through which the brain 
develops altruistic feelings and it has not found any evidence of some sort of unconscious 
community within humanity, but instead many hints that those feelings and collaborative 
mechanisms that develop from them orient themselves ultimately towards the survival 
not of the species but of the individual; in other words, the human being always ends up 
taking advantage –even if it is differed– from their relations with others, which does not 
mean they stop being sincere23. 
All those mechanisms, then, configure a constitutive predisposition towards 
collaboration, to which I refer when I propose the existence of a kind of “collaborative 
gene” in human beings. Note that the genetic reference does not imply, as Richard 
Dawkins explains, the subjection to remediless determinism. That something has a genetic 
origin simply implies that it exists in the physical-chemical constitution of the species, a 
set of elements (not literally a gene) whose presence usually has the consequence of 
favoring a certain type of behavior. But this predisposal can be perfectly made to grow, be 
                                                          
22 J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, OBRAS COMPLETAS 18 (Revista De Occidente 1973). 
23 DAMASIO, supra note 21, at 150-53, 207-09, 233-35. 
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neutralized, diminished and in an extreme, annulled by exogenous elements during 
foster24. 
So that when I refer to the collaborative gene in the human species I am in no case 
suggesting that there exists a predetermined political system whose origins are genetic. 
Not because it is unimaginable, or theoretically impossible that a gene might lead us to 
organize ourselves politically in a specific way (as may happen with ants and bees), but 
because the extension in time and the number of generations that have passed since man 
organizes himself politically does not seem to last enough to explain a genetic mutation 
that incorporates that type of organization25.  It should be pointed out that the existence of 
a gene –not only collaborative, but any type of gene– does not allow to make conclusions  
about the profitability of this gene for the species as a whole, as Dawkins points out, but 
only exclusively for that gene, or as well, for the individual who carries it26 . That is, if we 
apply this logic to the hypothesis of a collaborative gene, it is not possible to conclude that 
the gene exists for the benefit of the human species as a whole, therefore, neither can it be 
concluded that there is a kind of biology of universal solidarity.  That is why Dawkins 
elaborated the term “the selfish gene”27.  
At best we could then conclude that the gene induces us to have social organizations. 
But political systems, and within them, the different types of democracy, are contingent 
cultural solutions.  Democracy is a collaborative form, and thus is in some way 
consequence of the gene, but this does not mean that we are genetically democratic. In 
some way, the fiduciary democracy that is being proposed entails an organization that 
responds better than other systems to the anthropological needs that explain social 
collaboration. However, this does not mean that we are genetically obliged to organize 
ourselves in a fiduciary democracy. 
Otherwise, within our species, genetic endowment, including those features common 
to all individuals of the species, is not homogenous. Not all human beings are equally 
collaborative.   There is a variable range of congenital collaborative intensity, which in 
each case, besides, can be altered in practical behavior by exogenous factors as it has been 
said.  Therefore, our species and its cultures generate a wide range of individuals: some 
totally lacking in empathy (psychopaths literally) up to the contrary, beings dedicated 
completely to others in the style of Mother Teresa of Calcutta.  Culturally, in some way or 
in great measure because of the influence of Christianity, we have favored mother 
Teresa’s: those persons that embody altruistic excess and the sacrificial moral in favor of 
                                                          
24 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE: THE LONG REACH OF THE GENE 12-13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
25 Id. at 27-28. 
26 Id. at 28-29. 
27 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (Oxford Univ. Press 2006). 
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others28. This occurs to such an extent that several forms of political organizations –like 
the welfare States– have been structured around such a world view (see further in section 
6). 
But let us assume that, besides the cultural distortion in favor of exacerbated altruism 
as a moral value, the collaborative gene predisposes the majority of human beings to 
medium degrees of aptitude and preference for collaboration, which, are, in turn, affected 
by cultural factors. As it happens, among average individuals, those who decide to assume 
leadership, not only political but also entrepreneurial, are those who have that aptitude 
more developed. For example, studies about leadership have concluded that whoever 
assumes leadership positions usually have a more responsible attitude, even in a guilty 
sense, than the rest29.  This could imply that responsibility could be a typical characteristic 
of leaders.  This responsibility could also be translated as conscience that people expect or 
have fiduciary expectations of one.  Therefore, it is consubstantial to leadership to have a 
sense of fiduciary responsibility, the acceptance or assumption that one should do 
something for others. But, as previously stated, that does not imply denying that all agents 
also act in their own benefit30. Precisely, it only implies that these leaders maximize 
benefits or accomplish satisfaction of their preferences through an equation in which they 
assume the job of making decisions for others, and in exchange must deal with the 
responsibility that this entails. Leaving problems unresolved disturbs them, thus they 
prefer to solve them themselves. 
Therefore the political economy of how the government works, under the logic that 
politicians are also benefit maximizers (Public Choice), is not altered by this verification. It 
only explains what type of benefits they choose to maximize. 
 
       3.  Public goods and the delegation of power 
As Mancur Olson pointed out: “A state is, before anything else, an organization that 
provides its members, the citizens, with public goods.”31  In other words, if there were no 
public goods to manage, it would be very difficult to justify the existence of the State and 
the imposition of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force.  As force is violence, and 
                                                          
28 These people, however, find their own individual satisfaction –maximization of benefits, economists would say– in altruism. It is 
not that they stop putting their individual preferences before others, it is an individual preference to dedicate oneself to others’ 
welfare, as neuroscience also suggests (see supra note 23). 
29  Therefore, according to Business News Daily,: “Becky Schaumberg, a Stanford doctoral candidate in organizational behavior 
who conducted the research, said in group discussions guilt-prone members seemed to the rest of the group to be making more of 
an effort than others to ensure everyone´s voice was being heard to lead the discussion and to generally take charge. ‘The group 
was picking up on those behaviors,’ Schaumberg said.” 
Chad Brooks, Good Boss Study Suggests Guilt is Key Ingredient, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY, April 30, 2012. 
30 There are several studies about the psychological mechanisms that demonstrate the inclination to individualist behavior.  See 
e.g., SIMON LAHAM, THE JOY OF SIN 58 passim (Constable and Robinson Ltd. 2012) 
31 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 15 (Harv. Univ. Press 1965). 
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civilization consists in minimizing physical violence, a civilized society should also tend to 
minimize the State.  For that to happen it is imperative to have its scope of action correctly 
delimited, which ultimately depends on how public goods are defined. This because it has 
been verified that the temptation to understand extensively public goods in order to 
justify greater government intervention always exists.   
Public goods were defined by Paul Samuelson as collective consumer goods32. 
These are goods produced for all or otherwise are not produced at all, because the cost of 
excluding everyone from their use is so high, that such exclusion is impossible.  It is 
intrinsic to its physical or conceptual nature –but not moral; that is usually an ulterior 
distortion– that these goods cannot be subject to exclusive and excluding appropriation. 
But that is not enough for a good to be classified as public. The other typifying 
characteristic for a good to be public is that it does not have consumption rivalry.  That is, 
that the generalized consumption of that good does not generate its exhaustion.  These 
two characteristics, however, are relative because they can change, and in fact they do 
change throughout history, since technological advances have a way of modifying human 
capacity to exclude third parties in the use of a good, as well as consumption rivalry.  Thus, 
for example, the moment in which a public good, such as the air, would become 
susceptible of being “parceled out”, immediately that good, within the borders of the 
parcel that would allow to exclude it would in turn become perishable. 
In any case, goods can evolve from being public to being private.  For example, 
water used to be a public good and even now many people find it difficult to accept not the 
convenience but the necessity of administering its exploitation through the recognition of 
private titles over it, given the increasing sensation of its relative scarcity (in comparison 
to other times in which it was considered an inexhaustible good).  Highways are another 
example that a few years ago could only be public; but today there are automatic systems 
that identify vehicles in transit on a highway which allow charging for using it and 
therefore, in effect, privatize it.   
From what already has been said it can be inferred that a tendency to reduce the 
number of goods collectively owned should exist, and therefore also the delegation of 
power to manage those goods by reason of their nature.  In other words, a public good is 
matter for state administration as long as it cannot be turned into a private good, and until 
that happens.  Whenever it can become a private good, it is returned to its original owners, 
that is, the citizens33.  This is consistent with the idea that the government is a trust, as it is 
                                                          
32 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. 387, 387-89 (1954) 
33 Thus, for example, in the privatization of a good that before could only be perceived as public, let us say, the highway, it is not 
that each citizen receives his aliquot share of the highway, but that the price the concessioner pays, rewards each contributor, 
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common for a trust to have a limited period of validity, something is given to be 
administered until the owner can administer it himself, although, generally, in a private 
trust the cause which makes it impossible for the owner to directly administer the goods 
at stake has often more to do with subjective limitations of the owner (lack of age or 
inability) than with the nature of the goods entrusted.  In the logic of public companies, 
which also obeys to a fiduciary structure as has been mentioned above, the commission to 
the administration is much more directly linked to the nature of the goods that are 
entrusted to the management. In any case, the delegation of confidence as an 
anthropological phenomenon as it has been discussed in the previous section seems to 
have a temporal and shrinking foundation. If the origin of collaboration lies in the 
relationships that allow the survival of the helpless human being because of his premature 
birth, that trust begins to vanish with time as part of it includes to prepare the child to 
manage its own life. Life is the evolution from absolute communion (with the mother, in 
the uterus) to the absolute solitude of death, which is faced without company. Custody, 
then, must serve not to perpetuate dependency but to allow for independence. If we apply 
that logic to politics, democracy must generate citizens who are increasingly independent 
and free, not increasingly dependent and protected. The State should, therefore, be 
retreating instead of growing. 
That is a why a fiduciary democracy demands diminishing intervention of the 
State, although it should become increasingly efficient. However, what can be observed in 
reality is precisely the opposite, namely, increasing intervention as technology also favors 
renewed forms of intervention and control, even though elephantine States including the 
always well-intentioned welfare States, result, on the contrary, increasingly inefficient. In 
history and politics there are plenty of examples where generalized good intentions are 
confused with the public nature of goods. For example, I reckon that it is a mistake to 
assume that such a thing as a public good constituted by the yearning of a generalized 
material welfare exists. Welfare is not a public good, it is a private aspiration. It depends, 
to begin with, on subjective preferences that are not objectively standard. And it can only 
be achieved through the generation of wealth, a process that can occur individually as well 
as collectively, but whose collective attainment can be sustained on individual titles, that 
is, through a merely contractual collaboration, not necessarily fiduciary. Wealth is 
generated, usually, from private goods. When someone proposes an obligatory scope of  
shared material welfare with the argument that the mere fact of benefitting from positive 
externalities of coexistence generates obligations with the community, even when no 
                                                                                                                                                                          
through the State, for that good.  This could –really, should– redound patrimonially in favor of every citizen by way of a reduction 
in the tax burden, even though, unfortunately that does not always happen. 
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consent has been given voluntarily to such quid pro quo, as the rawlsean “principle of 
fairness”  proposes based on ideals of  Kantian-intuitive justice (fairness), what it finally 
produces is not universal collaboration but an expropriation of the assets and freedom of 
those who do not consent to that communitarian collaboration, as Nozick well asserts34.      
 
Another example of the aforesaid is the aspiration to an assumed universal right to 
health absolutely free of charge.  This does not constitute a public good.  I do not pretend 
to deny the existence of public health, I simply want to trace its limits.  The fight against 
epidemics, of course, calls for legitimate public action, inasmuch as scientific advances do 
not allow facing them effectively in a private manner. But that derives from the form in 
which diseases spread, literally (in many cases) in the air or sea, it being impossible to 
exclude the germs, or to prevent not their consumption but their involuntary ingestion.  Of 
course, the fight against a public danger, like the disease that spreads in such a way has to 
be fought by means of sanitary actions that do constitute a public good.  But that is not 
equivalent to the fact that goods and services –medical work– that constitute health 
should be distributed necessarily in a universally gratuitous way.  
To propose such a thing would imply a kind of universal obligation minding the 
destiny of absolutely each and every human being.  And, like it was analyzed in the 
previous section, there does not seem to exist an anthropological foundation –beyond 
faith– that supports this claim. As in Cesar Vallejo’s35 poem, human life could only be 
viable this way if absolutely all fellow humans of each individual involve themselves 
proactively in each others´ lives.  But poetry, even when it is good poetry (as Vallejo´s is) is 
a source neither of rights, nor of reality.  Preserving life is, of course, a fair reason to 
display collaborative strategies, but that does not mean that one can implicitly find buried 
in them a scope of action similar to the maximalist aspirations implicit in the right to 
                                                          
34 5038 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 95 (Basic Books 1974). 
35  “Al fin de la batalla, 
Y muerto el  combatiente, vino hacia él un hombre 
Y le dijo:<<¡No mueras, te amo tanto!>> 
Pero el cadáver, ¡ay! Siguió muriendo. 
Se le acercaron dos y repitiéronle: 
<<¡No nos dejes! ¡Valor! ¡Vuelve a la vida!>> 
Pero el cadaver, ¡ay! Siguió muriendo. 
Acudieron a él veinte, cien, mil, quinientos mil,  
Clamando <<¡Tanto amor y no poder nada contra la muerte!>> 
Pero el cadáver ¡ay! Siguió muriendo 
Le rodearon millones de individuos, 
Con un ruego común: “¡quédate hermano!” 
Pero el cadáver ¡ay!  Siguió  muriendo.  
Entonces todos los hombres de la tierra  
Le rodearon; les vió el cadáver triste, emocionado; 
Incorporóse lentamente 
Abrazó al primer hombre; echóse a andar.” 
15 CESAR VALLEJO, ESPAÑA, APARTA DE MI ESTE CÁLIZ 141 (Ediciones de la Torre 1992). 
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universal health.  As will be seen in the following parts, I do not pretend to deny that it is 
consubstantial to the human species to have a level or scope of collaboration with others –
I do affirm, precisely, that this is the basis of the fiduciary relations that maintain social 
coexistence– but I do question the assertion that such collective affectation is absolutely 
universal.   
The public goods that I just used as examples, welfare and free health, have in 
common that they are well intentioned aspirations, that is, generalized feelings (like 
solidarity) disguised as public goods. But they are not the only false public goods.  There 
are many others, much more objective, (although not necessarily more tangible) like 
natural resources, and within them, the radio electric spectrum. It is common to find in 
legal systems, as is the case of the Peruvian constitution, assertions to the effect that 
underground resources like minerals and oil belong to “all” or “to the nation.”  However, 
this is an awful way of assigning resources. It implies to understand that wealth is a group 
of physical objects preexisting before man appeared.  But wealth in reality resides in the 
transformation and utilization of those goods.  A mountain full of gold which cannot be 
extracted because of geological motives due to a determined status of technology is worth 
exactly zero.  It starts to acquire value only when the expectation of the production of such 
technology appears.  Therefore, human ingenuity is the absolute constituent of the value 
of things.  Its exploitation is the only source of wealth. Hence, nothing linked to the original 
deposit of natural resources justifies the socialization of its entitlements, the underground 
is as prone to become private as the ground; it has nothing public per se.  The same thing 
can be said about the radio electric spectrum. As Ayn Rand affirms, the property of this 
cannot constitutively belong to the State or be collective, because that property was born 
with the –private– discovery of radio electric waves.  And it was acquired originally in the 
way every property is acquired: working the resource, previously unused, converting 
nature into civilization36.   
  Thus, the author explains, “owner” is not the concept that describes best the role 
that the State should play before those goods, but “custodian”.  That is to say, the agent 
that defines objectively the impartial rules through which the potential (private) owners 
can acquire them37. Note the fiduciary element present in the above assertion.  Indeed, a 
custodian is someone to whom a certain good belonging to others has been given to keep.  
This is what happens in reality to all goods and services of which the State is in charge.  
None belongs to the State originally: all are state-owned by delegation.  Public property is 
                                                          
36 Ayn Rand, The Property Status of Airwaves in CAPITALISM : THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 131-39 (Signet 1967). 
37 Id. at 133. 
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–therefore– in all cases a mere fiduciary domain, and for this reason it is always subject to 
accountability, because it is always executed by mandate on behalf of its citizens. 
 
4.  The “social contract” is a trust  
If the congenital propensity of human beings to achieve some of their objectives 
through collaboration and the great difficulty to administer some goods that because of 
their nature are public justify a type of socio-political organization where those goods 
must be entrusted to a government, I propose that the nature of the so-called “social 
contract” which originates that government is the same or very similar to the one that in 
Private law originates the trust-agreement.  
I do not pretend to make a judgment on the temporal or conceptual pre-existence 
of one or another –the private trust and the political trust– but simply to imply that both 
figures respond to the same philosophic, anthropologic and economic logic: the need to 
entrust a commission of confidence of certain goods (private in one case; public in 
another) whose owners cannot –usually only in a temporal way– administer them by 
themselves for any reasons. 
Within western legal thinking, and particularly under Common law, fiduciary logic 
and contractual logic are not always easily compatible as Langbein admits38.  Partly 
because of this, I find that fiduciary logic may be a more appropriate approach to explain 
social organization than the simplistic contractual approach, which does not appear to be 
totally convincing to describe the interests, goods, incentives and structures at stake for 
the purpose of socio-political organization.  It is not that contractualism is radically wrong 
(at its roots), but it happens to be, perhaps, insufficient.  But, what additional elements, 
besides those merely contractual, exist in fiduciary logic that can better explain social 
organization? Always in the scope of Private law, the fiduciary implies the existence of 
supra-or-meta-contractual loyalties. The Supreme Court Judge Benjamin Cardozo´s verdict 
is famous as he practically “pulled out of his sleeve” the difference between merely 
mandatory duties and those of a fiduciary nature, to conclude that these last ones demand 
higher levels of loyalty than the first, even when the fiduciary relationship is established 
by contract39.  The core of the matter perhaps has to do with the fact that contractual 
duties have to be explicitly agreed, or else have to be taken into account in the law40, and 
                                                          
38 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. at 627(1995).  However, Langbein answers this 
idea, that attributes principally to historical reasons and secondly to economic ones, in order to restore finally the contractual 
nature of trusts.  
39 Meinhard v. Salmon 164 N.E. 545 (1928).  
40 But as is well known, positive or statutory law, in Anglo-Saxon law is very brief in contractual norms of the surrogate type, 
typical of the civil codes of the German-roman tradition, which also explains the exaggerated extension of Anglo-Saxon contracts, 
which is being imposed too –with less justification precisely due to the existence of codes– in the practice of Private law in Latin 
America. 
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what Cardozo apparently pretended was to extend the obligations much farther than what 
was originally agreed on.       
With similar logic in the scope under discussion it could be said, then, that political 
fiduciary relations also generate loyalty obligations –from governments and governors 
towards the citizens– that should go farther than what was explicitly stipulated in the law 
and even in the Constitution. This happens to be very compatible with the ideals that 
inspire modern day liberal democracies (so centered on the idea of the State being at the 
service of the citizen) and, well understood, the concept of loyalty also aligns itself with a 
libertarian vision of the economy. Because the increased loyalty that is required does not 
translate itself into paternalist activism –as it does not happen in law of trusts– but in high 
standards of diligence for the commissions specifically entrusted (which do not have any 
reason to be deemed extensively) and above all in effective accountability that assures a 
correct alignment of interests between agents and principals. 
As Langbein himself states, the central concern of the modern (private) law of 
trusts is to safeguard the beneficiaries of the trust from the eventual perils of bad behavior 
from the trustees (fiduciary agents or, simply, fiduciaries) who, for example, could 
unlawfully appropriate themselves, or badly administer the assets of the trust41. As is 
evident, the same concern results central to the legitimacy and efficiency of public affairs, 
meaning the functioning of the political trust-agreement.    
The structure of any trust is that the owner of a certain good (settlor) delegates a 
commission of confidence to a third party (trustee), so that they dedicate themselves to 
administer those goods in a diligent manner –and usually increase its fruits– to assure that 
the good entrusted as well as its fruits are at the service of a beneficiary (trust 
beneficiary).  It is common in a testamentary trust, for example, that the settlor and the 
beneficiary be different persons; but the structure of the contract also admits that both be 
the same person.  If we translate this to the political field, we could well set out things in 
two alternative perspectives: the first one, historical, where the settlors are the founders 
of the State (let us say a Constitutional Assembly or the founding fathers in the case of the 
United States), who establish the political trust for the benefit of future generations (who 
would be the beneficiaries). The other option is one where the trust is recurring, that is to 
say, citizens permanently entrust public goods to the trustees (authorities), in their own 
benefit.  In this logic, citizens are constantly settlors as well as trustee beneficiaries at the 
same time. Given that in the fiduciary democracy theory it will be more important to 
highlight the centrality of the beneficiary –citizen– than the constitutive genesis of the 
                                                          
41 See LANGBEIN, supra note 38, at 640. 
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trust or the determination of who is the settlor I will continue the analysis without 
assuming a final position about which of these two options is the more adequate one42.          
Democracy is not the only possible political trust-agreement, although it is 
probably the most correct and coherent with its causes and ends. A consented dictatorship 
or an absolute monarchy also imply that the State manages collective goods with the 
approval of its citizens.  But the delegation mechanisms end up being much less legitimate 
and functional.  They do not allow for healthy accountability (but only, in the extreme, a 
voluntary abdication or a violent revocation)43. And precisely when the trust is 
democratic, accountability mechanisms –derived from the increased loyalty described 
before– become substantial.  However, like Millan and Natal assert “accountability is 
mentioned only tangentially in the many theories that focus on the relationship between 
democracy  and social conditions…”44  Besides, “the inclusion of accountability in 
theoretical and practical themes related to democracy is relatively recent.”45   
Accountability, as has been established in previous sections, is destined to realign 
incentives that naturally tend to misalign themselves due to the vicarious structure of the 
trust and, in general, of all the relations that have an agent and a principal.  It is, as well, 
consubstantial to this type of relations that the agent has, roughly speaking, a greater 
degree of discretion.  That is to say, an agent is not a mere usher who follows detailed and 
precise instructions, but someone who is entrusted with administrative decision-
making46. Starting from the logic of methodological individualism that the Public Choice 
theory informs, one can define the center of the organizational problems that occupy us 
with the premise that “the agent has his own interests and the principal very little capacity 
to monitor the actions of the agent and to exercise his power to discipline him…  The basis 
of the problem is, generally, information asymmetry between both, and therefore, the 
costs of monitoring the agent –who does possess the information–, are high”47. This 
derives from the nature of the goods usually entrusted, public goods that being non-
exclusive in their use, and non-rival in their consumption also tend to possess diffuse 
features on the information available about them.   
                                                          
42 However, it cannot be overlooked, that one or another option would have, in another stadium of the analysis more linked to the 
daily awarding of justice, significant consequences.  Thus the historic or historicist option would be compatible with the tradition 
of constitutional textualism that is ceaselessly defended in the United States by conservative judge Antonin Scalia.  The second 
vision would be rather compatible with the vision of those who pledge for a more contingent constitutionalism, in the style of the 
“living Constitution” theories.  
43 “En una democracia directa o en una monarquía autárquica no cabe la accountability. En aquella, porque quien actúa y obtiene 
resultados es, simultáneamente, fuente original y depositario final de la autoridad; en esta, porque la rendición de cuentas se debe 
solo a la divinidad; es decir, ni aún a sus representantes terrenales.”  HENIO MILLAN & ALEJANDRO NATAL, LA RENDICIÓN DE 
CUENTAS A LA LUZ DE LA TEORÍA-AGENTE PRINCIPAL: UN ANÁLISIS DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN MÉXICO 6 (El Colegio Mexiquense 
2006). 
44Id. at 5.  
45 Id. 
46 “Accountability can only exist when there is margin for discretional acting”.  Id. at 6. 
47 Id. at 7 
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   The agent-principal structure, thus, establishes a game of collaboration that, by its 
same characteristics, carries a high risk of being badly resolved.  Applied to the 
government, the authorities (trustees) and the citizens (settlors) tend to display 
opportunistic behaviors instead of looking for pragmatic collaborative solutions, as 
described by the famous prisoner dilemma48.  Applied to the scope of collective action, this 
reveals that “if the number of people needed to propel and obtain a goal is inferior, the 
individual will have incentives not to cooperate because the purpose is not achieved.  Then 
he will incur in the costs of participation without obtaining benefits…when the number of 
people is superior to that required for collective action to render fruits… the rational 
individual will chose not to participate, precisely because he can obtain the benefits 
without incurring in the costs, as due to the characteristics of a public good, once the 
objective is produced, no one can be excluded from its benefits49. 
The aforementioned describes, or better yet, predicts the famous “tragedy of the 
commons” by virtue of which, either a few (politicians and their cronies) benefit from 
what belongs to all or, on the other hand, all are harmed by the action of those few50.  
However, the economist Elinor Ostrom –Nobel Economics Prize 2009– found several 
specific cases of particular communities in which the collective ownership of certain 
(public) goods were well administered in the benefit of that community and with the effect 
of assuring the sustainability of those resources.  What these cases have in common is 
well-established institutionalism defined by rules, responsibilities and above all a 
relatively small scope of delegation; that is, it functions in communities with strong 
functional and family ties51.  The aforesaid suggests that a political trust usually works 
better the nearer the agent is to the principal.  Therefore, the democratic trust works 
better if preferably close authorities are entrusted; that is, local governments, provided, of 
course, that there are accountability mechanisms sufficiently enforceable and functional in 
that scope.  This also suggests that the best “fiduciary polis” is not necessarily one defined 
in cultural terms, as communitarianism would tend to favor, but one where there is a 
predictable institutionalization; where it is clear what the members of that group expect 
from one another, because in general this is followed, and confidence is not systematically 
betrayed.  In fact, one of the main advantages of a fiduciary democracy consists in the fact 
                                                          
48 This consists of a theoretical model according to which two accomplices are taken prisoners and isolated from each other.  They 
are offered alternatives for collaboration with justice, by virtue of which, if both confess, they will have a moderately severe 
penalty (3 years), if none of the two confess, they will have lesser penalty (2 years), and if one confesses (betrays his accomplice) 
but the other one does not, the one who confesses will have the least penalty possible (1 year) and the other the greatest penalty 
possible (4 years).  As none of the two know what the attitude of the other will be collaboration becomes extremely difficult 
because it implies acting without sufficient information, which generates high incentives for non-cooperation.   
49 MILLAN & NATAN, supra note 43, at 9. 
50 Thus , for example, abuse on the part of certain beneficiaries of social benefits in welfare States would be an example of how 
citizens adopt opportunistic behaviors (rentiers at the State’s cost).  
51 ELINOR OSTROM, ROY GARDENER & JAMES WALKER, RULES, GAMES AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 289 (Univ. of Mich. 
Press 1994). 
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that the systematic confidence in its institutions generates great stability, not only political 
but also economic and social, in the long term.      
 
5.  Fiduciary democracy and its main elements 
If the social contract is, or is very similar, to a trust, it makes sense to intensify the 
fiduciary attributes of democracy to make it more functional and legitimate, always within 
the representative and liberal –in the classic sense of the word52– tradition, even if these 
attributes imply greater direct participation from the citizens. 
The direct elements of democratic participation that this model would incorporate, 
are practically limited to accountability and do not extend beyond other forms of 
participation, as will be analyzed further on.  If Athenian democracy was the direct 
participation of citizens in all or many of the State´s affairs53, all the arguments developed 
along this paper point to the material and logical impossibility of such participation, given 
the nature of the public goods in question. Thus, the need for delegation mechanisms in 
the form of commissions of confidence that fund the fiduciary-democratic relationship has 
been emphasized. For example, Richard Posner argues that a liberal State consists of a 
representative democracy limited by the rule of law, in which citizens do not play a 
significant role in the adoption of complex public policies precisely because they delegate 
that function54. 
But it is consubstantial to the fiduciary democracy here proposed that the 
commission or commissions of confidence be specific, not ample. Thus, the separation of 
powers. In fact, in the fiduciary democracy we should talk about respective commissions 
of confidence or trusts, one for each State function (meaning more than one for each State 
power, especially in the modern, increasingly technocratic-regulator States). What defines 
democracy is the limitation of power. What defines the fiduciary is the delegation of 
confidence. The key to a good democracy, legitimate and functional, would be finding the 
mechanisms that allow us to approach as closely as possible the equilibrium point where 
powers are sufficiently delegated, and yet, adequately limited.   
Fiduciary democracy or constitutionalism respond –like the theory of polyarchy, 
which proposes that in modern democratic systems features of Greek democracy, 
republicanism and liberalism converge55– to the conceptual tradition according to which 
modern western democracy does not consist only in popular vote, but also in the 
delegation of power and in the inalienability of fundamental rights.  
                                                          
52 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 56 passim (Polity 2006). 
53 Id. at 14. 
54 RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 140-49 (Harv. Univ. Press 2003).  
55 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 131 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2006). 
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For this reason, governments are forbidden to affect the citizens’ private goods 
which have not been entrusted. Hence, the inalienability of fundamental rights, which 
cannot be violated much less abolished by the majority through the pseudo-democratic 
referendum or plebiscite.  This follows the line of any classic definition of modern 
democracy, which consists in limiting the power of all minorities (including the majority 
which is made up of a set of minorities) so that no group can run over another, alienating 
their rights.  If the essential characteristic of the liberal democracy is to decentralize the 
political power of minorities and distribute it among as many hands as it is necessary, so 
that it becomes tremendously difficult  for a small group to affect the rights of their equals, 
as Norberto Bobbio well affirms,56 then the fiduciary democracy states that the way to 
decentralize power is by the very rules of a commission of confidence or trust-agreement, 
duly established in the Constitution, which is the founding or constituent document of that 
(political) commission of confidence. The implicit loyalties to which I have referred when 
explaining the fiduciary element, refer to the way explicit mandates should be interpreted.  
The concentration of power, therefore, would in itself break the confidence -of citizens in 
their governments- and would turn the commission into a usurpation of power.   
But, on the other hand, as Millan and Natal affirm, the logic of accountability would 
not exist if there was no ample discretion57. And as Langbein asserts, on his part, modern 
fiduciary law (relative to trusts) has revoked ancient laws that restricted the attributions 
of trustees, whose actual function consists in conducting investment programs and 
administering financial assets that require extensive discretion to respond to changing 
market forces58.   In primitive fiduciary schemes, trusts were thought of, only to preserve 
and transmit tracts of land, whereas now they have a much more sophisticated financial 
function.   
Does the same happen with political trusts? On the one side, the growth and 
sophistication of state mandates would suggest so. On the other hand, one cannot but 
observe a direct relation between the complexity and the effectiveness of the commission 
of confidence –whatever it may be– and the greater discretion of the trustee. Thus, for 
example, a surgeon or a plane pilot have more responsibility for the life of the 
beneficiaries of their services, but also require a greater level of discretion.  If one decides 
to travel by train he has greater freedom to revoke the transportation commission of 
confidence than the passenger of a plane (due to the fact that he can leave in the next 
station).  But at the same time the train passenger must undergo a less efficient transport 
                                                          
56 See BOBBIO, supra note 10. 
57 See MILLAN & NATAL, supra note 43. 
58LANGBEIN, supra note 38, at 641. 
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process (much slower and therefore temporarily more extensive).  Precisely, the bigger 
the delegation and the more discretion a trustee has, it is expected that the mandate be 
shorter.  Neither a complex surgery nor a flight can last forever; even when it is possible to 
imagine flights and surgeries that last several hours. In their turn, because of the 
dedication it requires and its complexity, these generate greater retribution for whoever 
provides those services. In the same way, in the political scope, when power is delegated 
with ample discretion, the mandate has to be short.     
It must be remembered that the fiduciary democracy, like any trust, implies that 
the power –or a specific public good– is given to administer precisely because it is 
impossible or very difficult for its owner –citizens in this case– to micromanage it. The 
trustee (the government) requires ample margin of discretion to do it effectively. In 
exchange, it has to account for relentlessly, but in order to exercise the mandate it cannot 
be frequently consulting the beneficiaries of the trust, because it threatens his commission 
to diligently manage what has been delegated. Hence, the equation that the more “direct 
public consultations imply more democracy” (as plebiscitary regimes hold) is not valid. I 
will sustain that consultations are democratic in as much as they fulfill accountability 
functions that reinforce confidence in the fiduciary system.                                
However, more discretion increases, in a directly proportional way, the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the trustees (authorities), which in turn endangers the viability 
and sustainability of the political organization itself.  This is so because power can be 
abused in the form of intrusive authoritarianism, or because public funds can be diverted 
in the form of corruption.  Therefore, it is consubstantial to democracy that there be 
mechanisms for realigning the incentives, one of which is power limitation which defines 
the liberal democracy, and in turn contravenes the concept of discretion of the authorities. 
This dilemma must be resolved through the establishment of very specific mandates in the 
elaboration of the frameworks in which the political fiduciary or trustee should act; that is, 
in the accuracy of the public goods entrusted to them. Once established, a greater degree 
of discretion can be allowed in the administration of these goods, providing that the 
corresponding accountability mechanisms exist. Now, once the corresponding public good 
is defined, this implies in itself that it is also necessary to specify with the highest possible 
degree of detail who is the holder of the good; that is, the beneficiary of such good.  The 
question then is, in each specific case, to whom does the authority who executes the 
commission owes his loyalty to in each specific public trust case.  Who must he benefit 
with his actions. The whole political community, understood as the whole country, is not 
always the beneficiary.  At the level of local governments, for example, the fiduciary loyalty 
corresponds to the interest of smaller communities.  In an increasingly complex State in 
 24 
the diversity of its commissions, the holders of public goods entrusted are also 
correspondingly diverse.   
It is important to specify this point, because usually, the state organs and 
organisms mix up their mandates by way of increasing them.  Thus for example, to quote a 
real case, not long ago the Transportation and Communications Ministry of Peru had to 
decide whether to renovate a telephone concession to a controverted company for the 
public opinion. The ministry´s way to legitimate the decision of renewing the concession 
was to include in the contract a series of obligations for the company that not only divert 
themselves from the functions the company had to comply with, but also the fiduciary 
duties of the ministry.  This was limited to extend the service coverage, but in its place, it 
dedicated itself to negotiate free services for a number of interest groups (retirees, 
bureaucrats). It could be argued that the State legitimately should try to facilitate life for 
these groups; but if that was the case, it was not the way to do so.  The mandate of the 
authority that grants the renovation is not to combat poverty, nor to ease the lives of 
pensioners. To introduce those elements into the equation is a distortion that misses the 
focus of its functions. Similarly, there are equivalent examples in other sectors. For 
example, the free competition agency has to guarantee that there is fair and free 
competition; not to look after and protect national industries. The Central Bank has a 
mandate to look after the strength of the currency, not to propitiate the reduction of 
unemployment. Thus, the examples are never-ending.   
Other consequences that derive from the application of the theory of the fiduciary 
democracy are related to questions that are important for political practice and public 
administration, for example: 
5.1 The space for direct participation mechanisms is limited to public 
consultations that have to do directly with consubstantial confidence in the 
system. This way, consultations that serve as a remedy for the loss of faith in 
the authorities (for example authority revocation) are considered legitimate. 
Note that differently to what has recently been proclaimed in Peru with certain 
lightness, it is not true that revocation is a mechanism for sanctioning 
corruption or crime. For this, there are other figures, such as vacancy and/or 
criminal lawsuits. Revocation is the remedy for political disillusion.  As is well 
known, the laws that govern false advertising do not apply to politics, and 
authorities are not subject to an imperative mandate as part of the foundations 
of representative democracy. But the abuse of these privileges could generate 
–and in fact does– a lack of confidence in politicians and the illegitimacy of 
democracy as a system.  That is why revocations are the exceptional remedy 
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for betraying political promises.  They are the sanction against misleading or 
false political advertising.  When voters feel systematically mocked by some 
politician who promised exactly the contrary of what they did once in office, 
the beneficiaries of the trust should have the option of revoking their mandate 
and confidence.  Another valid case for direct democratic participation has to 
do with the modification of the fiduciary mandate. When the principal decides 
to change the terms of the delegation, and in political life this is equivalent to 
modifying the Constitution, it is reasonable that it should occur through a 
referendum or public consultation.  These two figures (revocation and public 
consultation to modify the Constitution) are included, for example, in the 
Peruvian Constitution of 199359.  However, its regulation through 
constitutional development laws is not at all blissful and requires to be 
improved. For example, in the case of revocation, there is no consistency 
between how local revocable authorities are elected (in closed lists) and how 
they are revoked (individually); neither is there any consistency between the 
number of votes required to be elected and the number of votes needed for 
revocation (in theory it is possible to revoke with less votes than those the 
elected authority obtained to be designated), among other inconsistencies.  In 
any case, it is worthwhile to specify here that the mechanisms for direct 
participation that a fiduciary democracy should favor are those which are 
exerted spontaneously by citizen initiative, not those that the legal system 
imposes mandatorily every so often or when a certain situation has been 
verified. As David Altman says, the first have proven to be a lot more effective 
and legitimate than the second that usually have resulted in undesirable 
consequences60. 
5.2  All public property is a fiduciary domain; that is, the State is not the original 
titleholder, it is merely delegated to it, and therefore, is subject to diverse 
limitations to its free availability, all of which derive directly from the fiduciary 
loyalty specifically guaranteed in the commission of confidence which 
                                                          
59 But this does not imply that the Constitution of 1993 is an utter expression of fiduciary democracy. Even though I have affirmed 
in another paper that this Constitution should remain in force and it has won legitimacy – GONZALO ZEGARRA MULANOVICH, 
Eterno resplandor de una mente sin recuerdos (constitucionales) in EL DERECHO VA AL CINE 125, 125 passim) (Cecilia O’Neill de la 
Fuente ed., Universidad del Pacífico 2013). –I have also argued systematically through my opinion editorials the need to introduce 
reforms to the Constitution to perfect the political system enshrined in it.  What the suggested reforms have in common –
bicameralism, voluntary vote, uninominal districts, partial Parliament renewal, etc. – is precisely to improve, under a fiduciary 
logic, the confidence of citizens in the government and the efficiency of this, all which would lead to greater legitimacy of the 
system.  
60 DAVID ALTMAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE 60 passim (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
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originated the fiduciary ownership that justifies the public property of that 
good.  
5.3 Derived from the above, any act of corruption is at the same time an 
expropriation –of a fiduciary domain entrusted in a commission of confidence– 
and an aggravated theft, because it not only implies deciding over the property 
of others (the citizens in this case) but also betraying  fiduciary duties. That is, 
incurring in a punishable disloyalty; equal to the betrayal of an unfaithful 
custodian or keeper (the guardian of a good who appropriates it). 
5.4 Accountability is consubstantial to political representation –as has been 
extensively described– and the disintermediation of authorities and citizens 
(agents and principals), which requires the adoption of electoral mechanisms 
that guarantee this, such as the implantation of uninominal districts in 
parliamentary elections.      
5.5 Governance problems or the effectiveness of public administration derive from 
the same misalignment of incentives that are observed in private relations 
between owners and managers of a public company; that is, they are agency 
problems or between the “agent” and their “principal”, as has also been 
described in detail, which can be usually rationalized through (mathematical) 
formulas of incentive realignment61. 
5.6 The State should only do for the citizens what they cannot do directly for 
themselves, which taken to the entrepreneurial scope, implies that the State 
should only embark in entrepreneurial activities when citizens cannot (and this 
is linked to the nature of public goods, as was seen in section 3 of this paper).  
Thus, the theory of fiduciary democracy justifies, not only economically, but 
philosophically and politically the subsidiarity principle of State 
entrepreneurial activities consecrated, for example, in the 1993 Peruvian 
Constitution.  According to it, and to its development in laws such as those of 
unfair competition, the State is forbidden to compete with private 
entrepreneurs. Its participation in public enterprises has to be justified 
exclusively  in the need for certain services to be provided, and in the 
confirmation that nobody  is doing so.  But if any private company does provide 




                                                          
61 MILLAN & NATAL, supra note 43, at 11. 
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6. Main betrayals to democratic trusts 
Naturally, democracy fails.  The so called failures of the social contract could be labeled 
as betrayals in a system that emphasizes the fiduciary elements of that contract. In this 
section, instead of making a list of those historical failures or betrayals, I will concentrate 
on the more recent problems in modern democracies, particularly in Latin America.  
Broadly speaking, I will identify 3 recurrent types of democratic betrayal, each of them 
related to a different crashing or misalignment cause in regard to the commission of 
confidence scheme that typifies democracy. 
 
6.1 Mercantilist Democracies 
The first type of betrayal is the one traditionally observed in Latin American 
democracies until a few decades ago and which now appears to be declining. In them, 
representative democracy existed in form but it did not generate the conditions needed to 
assure the fulfillment of the individual-citizens through meritocratic advances in the style 
of democracies of the developed world, instead, power was used as an instrument to 
ensure the hegemony of certain social groups or oligarchies of any sort (not necessarily 
economic, although certainly these, as well as military, ideological, religious, and 
eventually labor union ones).  They were not really liberal democracies, but mercantilist. 
These democracies perpetuated a classist organization, sometimes an exploitive 
one; and, in many cases, forms of servile labor.  Politics was placed at the service of group 
interests.  The most eloquent examples that come to my mind are recent, from a historical 
point of view, but not descriptively in force. I am thinking of Peru previous to the state 
coup of General Juan Velazco Alvarado in 1968, of Ecuador before Rafael Correa assumed 
power, or in pre-chavist Venezuela.  It is not by chance that those regimes were deposed 
or substituted by authoritarian populisms.  The wear and tear of the mercantilist 
economic system –which generated perks and privileges– brings about as a corollary the 
discredit and delegitimization of the political system that backs it.  Thus, mercantilism is 
substituted by populism and the democratic mechanisms by authoritarian forms.  In a 
recent work, economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson describe, precisely, the 
rationality of the populist twist62.  According to them, for a rational agent who belongs to 
the most disadvantaged socioeconomic levels, in the short term (but clearly not in the long 
run) a way of maximizing benefits is to chose a populism that satisfies immediate 
necessities and preferences even in a welfare manner, rather than to perpetuate social and 
economic organization schemes that close the door to access opportunities and success.  
                                                          
62 DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY (Crown 
Business 2012). 
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And that is what occurs in mercantilist democracies, which is the way we can label, for 
linguistic thrift, the systems which I am referring to. They all are characterized by 
bureaucratizing the economy and politics by establishing all types of barriers and 
cronyism.  In a certain way, it is the world described by Hernando de Soto, Enrique Ghersi 
and Mario Ghibellini in their celebrated work El Otro Sendero63, even though the country 
they describe historically is Peru after the Velasco populism (and a product of the same).  
It happened that when democracy came back, political rhetoric changed, it became 
strongly statist/interventionist, but the exclusionary mechanisms that kept the great 
majority of people out of the markets, were preserved.  With fear for which I apologize 
beforehand, I could suggest that current verifiable versions of this type of democracy are 
the ones now reigning in countries such as Paraguay or Guatemala, but my distance from 
those countries and my superficial knowledge of their socio-political realities compel me 
to formulate this hypothesis in a purely preliminary manner and absolutely conditional 
(open to a refutation on the part of those closer to these realities).        
The failure in this type of regime is sufficiently obvious, and answers graphically to 
the logic described along this paper: a misalignment of interests between leaders and 
constituents, trustees and beneficiaries, agents and principals.  Take note that mercantilist 
democracies usually adopt the forms of traditional representative democracies (not 
improved or fiduciary as we use the terms). Well, under the traditional scheme of 
representative democracy, that completely mistrusts the direct participation of citizens 
and practically limits their participation to general elections only, it is difficult to establish 
vertical accountability mechanisms that could difficult or impede power from deviating 
from the interests it should represent to serve small groups of influence.  These defects 
could be corrected by establishing more direct and precise accountability mechanisms, 
which would include, for example, geographical circumscriptions more bounded for 
parliamentary representation –which generate disintermediation between 
representatives and their voters– as has been suggested.  
Another determining factor, no doubt, is the ampleness and imprecision of political 
mandates to avoid the indetermination of public action and focus clearly on its functions 
and their loyalty beneficiaries, looking for greater effectiveness, as was seen in previous 
sections. 
 
6.2 Authoritarian populisms 
Instead of rationally correcting these deficits of traditional representative 
democracy with more and better accountability mechanisms that respond adequately to 
                                                          
63 HERNANDO DE SOTO, ENRIQUE GHERSI & MARIO GHIBELLINI, EL OTRO SENDERO (Editorial Oveja Negra 1987) (1986).  
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fiduciary logic, we observe –in part of our continent at least– a certain tendency to replace 
mercantilist democracies with populist authoritarianisms.  This seems to be the case today 
in several countries of the Latin-American region, such as, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and with less intensity but with more complexity, Argentina. As it is 
predictable, that model constitutes the second –and, of course, more serious– type of 
betrayal of the democratic trust as it involves a remedy which is worse than the disease.  
Indeed, a misalignment of interests’ problem ends up being faced with a much more 
intense delegation of power.   
Thus, representative intermediation is attacked through direct popular delegation.  
But really, the problem required ex-post control mechanisms (accountability) that 
returned the power to the principals (citizens) in case of power deviation, instead of 
exacerbating the delegation act through plebiscitary schemes that prevent accountability, 
because the relationship established between the agent and the principal is hopelessly 
marked by the absolute dispersion of interests and the diffuse (imprecise) nature of the 
mandate. 
Authoritarian populisms usually arrive and perpetuate themselves in power 
through a destructive rhetoric against democratic institutions and its agents.  They 
frontally attack the political classes that preceded them in power.  They usually fund an 
eminently anti-political stage, in the sense in which power limitations are banished 
through the separation of powers of the State, on one hand; the control mechanisms or 
checks and balances, on the other hand; and finally almost any form of political 
deliberation through the effective neutralization of the majority of independent media, or, 
at least, the more powerful64. This anti political interregnum could be read as a reaction of 
the Latin American population to the inefficiency of traditional politics, partisan and 
institutionalized. In this reaction, typically an overpolitization of many subjects is 
produced which should not be matter of the fiduciary delegation and that hyper-
bureaucratize politics and/or the economy, as we have seen when we discussed the 
mercantilist democracy.  Thus, disenchantment with bureaucratic politics makes people 
trust efficient and spendthrift caudillos (dictators) who, certainly, neither resolve the 
dilemmas of the imperfect delegation65.  Their typical way of legitimizing themselves is 
                                                          
64Although recent modes include a certain apparent “tolerance” to opposing media, typically written ones, in as much as these do 
not seriously compromise the direct relationship of the dictator with the masses.  
65 “En otro extremo, se encuentra la indiferencia de la ciudadanía y el debilitamiento de los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas, 
que entregan el control total de los asuntos públicos a la autoridad –el agente– y acepta todos sus resultados, siempre y cuando 
respete el marco legal y los procedimientos que de él emanan. Este tipo de situaciones es propio de gobiernos dirigidos por líderes 
carismáticos, en los cuales se deposita toda la confianza, y la accountability es innecesaria e impensable como reclamo ciudadano 
porque no existe el problema de agencia: aun cuando la propiedad y el control del poder se encuentran separados, la confianza en 
que el agente actuará en todas las circunstancias a favor de sus representados llevará a que los resultados adversos o insuficientes 
de su gestión obedezcan en forma exclusiva a factores ajenos a su control. Este escenario suele derivar en regímenes con varios 
grados de autoritarismo, en la medida en que la confianza se puede constituir un activo que permite, inicialmente, excepciones a la 
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through means of plebiscitary mechanisms or direct democracy, generally established 
beforehand in the political system itself (that is to say, legally and constitutionally 
foreseen) but not spontaneously requested by the population.  
 
Under this perverse logic, what is more frequently verified is that plebiscites are 
used to exceed the reasonable terms of the political commission of confidence, so as to 
extend it to fields which in no way justify a delegation of power, because usually there is 
no public good at stake, such as we have defined it in section 3 of this paper.  That is to say, 
plebiscites in direct democracies usually serve as a pretext for governors to achieve a 
greater attempt to monopolize power, affecting the fundamental rights of certain 
minorities. In fact, these consultations are the easiest and most direct way of 
expropriating, not only property rights, (although, these also, of course) but also other 
fundamental non patrimonial rights.  This is the case –for example– of certain public 
consultations that took place in Ecuador a couple of years ago, which dealt with themes 
that ranged from freedom of expression, up to the right to attend bullfights, imposing 
limits by virtue of which the government ended up having decisive power in relation to 
such areas.  In other words, the government generated the fiction that these are 
entitlements which originally belong to the State –or the collective–, when not only they 
do not because of their nature, but cannot even be delegated to the State, because they are 
not public goods (diffuse, non-excludable and with no rival consumption), but subjective 
rights (private). Even though 90 per cent of the population wants it, fundamental rights 
such as life and property cannot be abolished. The guarantee for that is a document called 
the Constitution, which limits the capability of the voters to affect those rights by votes.  
That is to say, it establishes the terms of the trust or delegation of confidence, establishing 
limits for their need.  
In authoritarian populisms, then, direct democracy mechanisms –instead of 
assuring that the actions of the agent respond to the will and interests of its principal– 
usually constitute in a simple way plebiscitary means to skip other representative 
institutions or to clear themselves from the responsibility of adopting harsh policies. Or, 
they simply constitute tools of populist mobilization and legitimation, as Altman asserts66, 
when referring to popular consultations typically instrumented from the constituted 
power and not by the spontaneous initiative of citizens, as typically happens in populist 
authoritarianisms. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conducta legal esperada, y después, una justificación más sistemática de procedimientos fuera de la ley”.  MILLAN & NATAL, supra 
note 43, at 22.    
66 ALTMAN, supra note, at 86. 
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Many are the ways in which populist authoritarianisms betray the democratic 
trust.  To begin with, they violate the idea of the limitation of power which supports the 
separation of powers, by way of emphasizing the direct and concentrated delegation. This 
is, perhaps, the most eloquent expression of what O´ Donnell called “delegative 
democracy”67. In that line, it emphasizes the fiduciary element in a perverse way by 
situating it only at the genesis of the establishment of a government but at the same time, 
practically disappearing it in successive stages, in other words, making it impossible to 
verify effectively the healthiest accountability mechanisms.  At the same time, populist 
authoritarianism discredits democracy because it makes it unlikely since it incorporates 
the populist element in its value-promise. As Uruguayan ex president Julio Maria 
Sanguinetti said:  “Populism is promising what cannot be accomplished”.  Populism is, 
therefore, a congenitally fraudster and liar.  On the contrary, fiduciary democracy has one 
of its pillars in the effective accomplishment of the implicit or explicit promise in the 
commission of confidence awarded to the trustee or governor.  Populism promises 
something that should not be promised, because it is not necessary –there is no public 
good to justify it– nor is it feasible ultimately. In this it is similar to the third type of 
fiduciary betrayal –the welfare State– that we shall see next, although the genesis and 
ways of one and the other are, of course, different.  However, the logic of excessive 
promise is similar in both cases, so the explanation I will develop around this specific 
point for the welfare State is also true for populism.  
 
6.3 Welfare States 
The third model of fiduciary betrayal is, of course, the welfare State. It was 
originally based on the aspiration of achieving democratic societies where it would be 
possible to achieve equal opportunities; however, the ideal of a welfare State degenerated 
through history to unsustainable extremes.  In fact, as a political model, it has proved its 
unfeasibility in the recent European crisis, where it has been seen with crystal clarity that 
the financing of the maximalist benefits promised by the continental European 
democracies was a fiction based on an unpayable debt. The fiction of that welfare –no 
matter how many times it was identified as a “right”– was built at the cost of a 
governmental leverage that presents a double problem:  moral and functional.   
The moral problem consists in translating present welfare costs to future 
generations; in other words, organizing a society where each new citizen comes into the 
world not with bread under his arm; but with debt under his arm.  That each newborn 
citizen is born indebted to fulfill the increasingly hedonistic needs of his predecessors is a 
                                                          
67 See O’Donnell, supra note, at 15. 
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reality that has little or nothing to do with the founding promise of equal opportunities.  
But as if this moral problem was not enough to reconsider the model, a second problem 
certainly linked to the first, has to do with the practical viability of welfare States; and is 
based on the demographic problem.  Europe, and in general the developed world (except 
the United States) have population structures in the form of inverted pyramids; this is to 
say, where the adult population exceeds the young or new population. And the intrinsic 
logic of welfare States is one in which the economically active population (that is to say, 
the young) have to provide welfare not only for themselves and their direct dependents, 
but also through an ambitious social security, to all the economically inactive population, 
be that children, adolescents, college-age youth (which extends almost limitlessly through 
doctorates and post-doctorates) and retirees (who retire increasingly at younger ages). If 
you add this to tremendously restrictive immigration policies, including and above all, of 
young people in a productive age, very frequently triggered by union lobbying that 
attempt to restrict the entrance of workers willing to charge less than the native unionized 
workforce, we have a very explosive (or implosive?) cocktail.  
Welfare States in Europe (and that includes Spain, which is part of Spanish 
America, as is obvious) are on the road to an inescapable reassessment. And those who are 
not, because they have survived reasonably well to the crisis –like Scandinavian 
countries– have already gone through reform processes in previous decades that 
decreased the maximalist tone to their welfare promises, for example, by relaxing the so-
called labor rights68.   
But the most ambitious welfare claims of those countries who have not introduced 
such reforms have failed or are failing in their task, by means of excesses and the lightness 
of their promises.  The promise of an absolute and general material welfare achieved in 
violation of the principle of causality in the generation of wealth –wealth does not pre-
exist; it is generated by human work which authorizes whoever achieves it to appropriate 
the results of it– constitutes a utopian promise in Nozick´s words.69        
In fact, what the maximalist –but accurate– version of the welfare State described a 
few lines back, ultimately promises, is a world where citizens do not have to produce their 
own wealth, since it is theoretically provided by the State, which for those effects is 
conceived as if it were no one in particular, but in the physical reality (I will not even 
mention economically) of the world is made up of the productive citizens.   
In the welfare State, a very few, casually the harder and more skillful workers, have 
to finance the material wellbeing of a majority who consider that it is immoral that the 
                                                          
68 According to the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation, for example, Denmark is the ninth freer country of the 
world, Finland the sixteenth, Sweden the eighth and Norway (more laggard) the thirty-first (Peru is ranked 44th).  
69 NOZICK, supra note 34 , at 297 passim. 
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productive class  appropriates itself legitimately of the wealth that it has produced.  This is 
because conversely to what is assumed too frequently, the “natural” state of man (natural 
in the literal sense of the word, in other words, savage, pre-civilized, pre-cultural) is 
poverty.  Man appears poor in the world. Wealth does not consist of anything else than his 
intervention in the world around him in order to transform it with his intellect and his 
hands.  Natural resources per se are not wealth but this is generated with their 
transformation through cleverness (as was seen in section 3 of this paper). Therefore, 
there exists no welfare “cake” that should be distributed (or redistributed) amongst all. 
Implicitly lies in that extended conception a fallacy of mystic origin:  the idea that 
natural resources have been given to the human species in trust by God. Only a vision like 
that one, or something very much akin, would justify the idea that the wealth that each 
individual generates through his transformation of the world should not be at his entire 
disposal; and that on the contrary, he has a fiduciary mandate by virtue of which he should 
“give it back” properly transformed, to other human beings who have not participated in 
the wealth producing process70. But in the absence of such a theological basis –and I am 
assuming that a democracy is a non-confessional secular form of government–, there is no 
reason to conclude that the goods that do not qualify as public because of their intrinsic 
characteristics should belong originally to all citizens. The argument that there exists 
some sort of implicit universal contract that imposes on every individual obligations 
towards other existing persons just because we enjoy of some goods in common does not 
result convincing. One thing does not follow the other, especially if these obligations are 
formulated in a maximalist, extensive and encompassing manner. At least concerning the 
welfare that is generated privately or individually, from where does the “implicit” 
obligation to share it universally arise? To impose that redistributive maximalism71 
constitutes a systemized confiscation which is not compatible with the elemental 
freedoms72.  
                                                          
70 “...todos esos esfuerzos hubieran sido vanos e inútiles, más aún, no se hubieran podido comenzar, si la bondad del Creador de 
todas las cosas, Dios, no hubiera antes otorgado las riquezas y los instrumentos naturales, el poder y las fuerzas de la naturaleza”. 
PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931) 
71 On the other hand, a more moderate version of the redistributive momentum could be justified not only in the argument that 
freedom should found itself in the equality of opportunities, but also in the verification that at least some of the already 
distributed wealth was done so under incompatible mechanisms with complete economic freedoms, in other words, under 
authoritarian coercion, or under mercantilist regimes that used politics as a tool (and thus public goods) to favor illegitimately 
private enrichment of specific oligarchies. A restorative redistribution of confiscation which was implicit in that initial illiberal 
distribution would be compatible with a fiduciary democracy of libertarian stamp. 
72 “Jobs, food, clothing, recreation (!), homes, medical care, education, etc. do not grow in nature. These are man-made value –
goods and services produced by men. Who is to provide them? If some men are entitled by right to the products of the work of 
others, it means that those others are deprived of rights and condemned to slave labor. Any alleged “right” of one man, which 
necessitates the violation of the rights of another, is not and cannot be a right. No man can have a right to impose an unchosen 
obligation, an unrewarded duty or an involuntary servitude on another man. There can be no such thing as “the right to enslave”. 
AYN RAND, Apendix: Man’s Rights in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 372-73 (Signet 1967). 
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The fallacy that the State should directly provide people with welfare (surrogating 
the responsibility of doing that themselves) achieves grotesque extremes in practice. As 
Nicholas Eberstadt points out, in the United States collecting disability payments has 
become a way of life.  It is so extreme, that in 2011 more than 12 million North Americans 
of working age did this; in other words, the State subsidized a population bigger in 
numbers than the whole manufacturing labor force of that country73.     
 
Nobody can hold a legitimate expectation, much less a right, to be perpetually 
supported economically by others. Less so, if those others have no specific fiduciary duties 
with that person. One may think, like Rawls74 did, that it would be fair that the creation of 
wealth be governed by a principle different to causality by which it is governed. But to 
consecrate as a political program, or even worse, as a constitutional objective, mechanisms 
destined to make physical laws different to how they are because we consider them unfair, 
is once again in words of Nozick, pure uthopia75. But besides, it is making the (welfare) 
State a surrogate of the old God of Christianity; perfect in his perfection and able to 
transform, when his inscrutable will so esteems, what is imperfect into perfect; what is 
unjust into just; in the same way he transforms bread into the body of Christ76. Physical 
reality can thus be transformed, but not refounded by man.  He does so in search of his 
own welfare, and that of his more beloved beings.  But he does not do it for a universal 
idea of equal justice that can be verified in a material sense. The human being who 
complains to the State that the world is not like he would like it to be and therefore 
requires that it be changed (to his measure) does not distinguish himself conceptually 
from the child who cries before his mother because the sun has gone and he would like to 
continue enjoying it. That is why it becomes a democratic advantage, more than a 
disadvantage, that constitutions and laws be brief in promises instead of maximalist. That 
has a great influence on their credibility, and therefore, on the legitimacy of democracy.  A 
democracy that promises and cannot fulfill what it promises suicides itself. A democracy 
that is more effective than its declarations of good yearnings is strengthened. 
The only universal fiduciary duty conceivable that applies to all human beings is 
respect for their equal freedom.  If it were not true that everyone has a right for their 
freedom to be respected, then nobody could justify ex ante his right to be free. But we 
                                                          
73Nicholas Eberstadt,  Uncle Sam as Santa, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/335866. 
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refer, as it is obvious, to a negative freedom in the terms of Isaiah Berlin77, even if like 
Holmes and Sustein state, all negative freedom requires in the extreme an act (of defense, 
for example)  by the State, and this of money to finance itself or otherwise it would not be 
enforceable78.    
Equal freedom is the only guarantee that we have to achieve our individual 
survival and start looking for our happiness (in all its possible subjective variations). But 
there is no mandate that socializes economic productivity and makes it a common good. 
Therefore, the implicit promise of the welfare State results false. Turning the private into 
public, through the means of expropriation or through regulations that bureaucratize 




The theory of the democratic trust and its paradigm of the fiduciary democracy not 
only seek to be a balance between representative and direct democracies (although they 
have elements of both), but neither do they suggest a third way between capitalism and 
socialism, nor a hybrid vision between an individualistic philosophy and a collectivist one. 
Just like this theory begins with the representative democracy to try and improve it with 
specific direct participation mechanisms, it also does from a libertarian vision to 
complement it with an explanation of the undisputed phenomenon of collaboration in the 
human species, insufficiently discussed on the liberal tradition from contractual positions. 
In that way, it attempts to provide with tools that lead to improve democracy emphasizing 
in its fiduciary elements –until now insufficiently served–, looking to obtain an 
equilibrium point where the political powers are both sufficiently delegated and 
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